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ntroduction 
Are we on the brink of a ‘FinTech’ based disruptive revolution in 
banking? Such transformative change has indeed happened in many other 
industries (see CHRISTENSEN AND RAYNOR (1997, 2013)). A combination of 
new security and communication technologies – the internet and digitial 
signature – together with changing customer attitudes – the millennial 
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generation who are comfortable with virtual conduct of almost all their 
transactions – suggests that banking may also now also ripe for profound 
technology driven change.  
There are though reasons for scepticism. Predictions of transformative 
technological change in banking have been made in the past and yet the 
industry has clung to old structures and old ways of doing things. To choose 
one example, IBM INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS VALUE (2005) painted a picture 
of dramatic technology and customer driven change in banking over the 
decade 2005-2015 which never took place. One explanation for this slow 
rate of change is that adoption of new technology in banking requires co-
ordinated change and so, as a result, incentives for adoption are 
comparatively weak (this argument developed in MILNE (2006, 2007) is 
stated more fully below).  
This paper argues that technological developments have indeed matured to 
the point where dramatic change in banking and other financial services is 
possible – but for this to happen requires public poicy intervention to 
overcome the barriers to accessing both proprietary and shared banking 
platforms that otherwise undermine incentives for technological innovation 
and adoption. Firm and far sighted action by both central banks and 
competition regulators will be needed to open up key monopoly elements 
to potential competition and hence create incentives for innovation. This 
will take time – the FinTech revolution in banking will not be as rapid as 
some suppose. But if policy intervention is supportive then technology 
driven change in banking will eventually be profound. 
he promise of financial technology 
Innovative Financial Technologies are now attracting substantial 
investor interest. ACCENTURE (2016) report a cumulative $50.1bn of 
venture capital funding for Fintech start-ups in the years 2010-2015 with 
$22.3bn of funding in 2015 alone. FinTech is being applied to a remarkable 
range of different activities (see Figure 1). These entrepreneurial 
effort is particularly great in five areas: capital markets technology 
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(facilitating the buying and selling of financial securities for professionals); 
payments (payments process, cutting processing costs, enabling digital 
currencies to become reliable and mobile phone payment); data analytics 
(leverage big data for financial matters as risk management; fraud 
detection and credit monitoring); bank credit & corporate financial 
information(complementing or disrupting traditional banking and corporate 
finance processes such as loan origination and corporate accounting and 
cash management); and personal finance management (manage stock 
portfolios, personal budgets and taxes through technology). 
To date the most dramatic developments have taken place outside of 
mainstream banking. M-Pesa in Kenya has been a pioneer for mobile based 
monetary transfer in emerging markets, allowing money transfer outside of 
the banking system and allowing millions without bank accounts to move 
from 19th century paper money to 21st century digital money in a single leap 
(MBITI and WEIL (2011)). Bitcoin has demonstrated the possibility of a 
secure software based virtual cryptocurrency without any central issuing 
authority at all (an account of the underlying technology is provided by 
NARAYANAN, BONNEAU, FELTEN, FELTEN, & GOLDFEDER (2016)).  
Financial Technology has particular promise as a means of achieving 
Eurpean Union policy objectives, promoting the single market in financial 
services and, in particular, the goals of ‘Capital Markets Union’, ‘Banking 
Union’ and the provision of risk finance to smaller innovative companies. 
MILNE (2015) has argued that – with appropriate measures to support pan-
European standards – FinTech can play a crucial role in achieving European 
policy objectives. 
Despite these exciting possibilities, most customer experience of FinTech in 
the developed world is of gradual exploitation of new possibilities by 
incumbent institutions. The major banks are slowly and cautiously 
developing new parallel technology based channels for service delivery. 
Expamples include online and mobile- banking applications or point-of-sale 
payment or the point of sale payment services on mobile telephones. These 
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developments offer customers greater convenience but are far from 
challenging the position of incumbent institutions. 
There are a few examples of successful competition from non-banks, a 
range of alternative financial products such as peer-to-peer lending 
(developments in alternative finance in Europe, the Americas and the UK 
respectively, are summarised by WARDROP, R., ZHANG, B., RAU, R., & 
GRAY, M. (2015), WARDROP, ROSENBERG, ZHANG, ZIEGLER, SQUIRE, 
BURTON, AND GARVEY (2016) and ZHANG, BAECK, ZIEGLER, BONE & 
GARVEY (2016)). Alternative non-bank providers of foreign exchange 
transactions such as CurrencyFair and Transferwise provide much cheaper 
services for retail customers than incumbent banks. ‘Peer to Peer’ lending 
platforms have grown rapidly, First in the UK and the US and subsequently 
in other countries. Despite these developments market shares of these 
non-bank competitors still remain relatively small. Overall, despite the 
excitement and the wide range of new intiatives, we are still some way still 
from seeing a truly transformative impact of FinTech on banking. 
 
 
  
Inancial networks and the weak incentives for innovation  
An explanation for these slow rates of technological innovation in 
banking is provided by MILNE (2006, 2007). Those papers focus on 
payments technologies, but the point is a more general one: the network 
structure of financial services means that the adoption of innovation 
requires co-ordination amongst many competing institutions. Even when all 
institutions benefit such co-ordination is problematic. In practice there are 
usually losers whose profit margins depend on helping customers overcome 
technological inefficiencies. Those losers will be especially reluctant to 
agree to technological innovation that substitutes for their services. The 
result is a market failure, innovation in financial services suffers from 
F 
A. MILNE 5 
‘excess inertia’ (FARRELL AND SALONER (1985)) relative to the socially 
optimal outcome. 
MILNE (2006, 2007) develop the example of retail payments. For a payment 
to be transmitted from an account held by customer a in Bank A to an 
account held by cutomer b in Bank B, the banks must agree on the 
instructions required for initiation of the payment and on the arrangements 
for settlement. Such agreements are encapsulated in payment schemes – 
covering debit and credit cards, credit transfers, direct debits, ATM 
withdrawals and others. Getting agreement on innovation in payments 
schemes is difficult because no individual bank gains any competitive 
advantage from innovation, even where these changes benefit customers. 
The same argument applies to other banking and financial services. The 
assessment of retail credit risk depends on access to histories of past loan 
applications and loan repayment. Banks have collaborated or worked with 
public authorities on developing credit registers that contain this essential 
information. But they can be reluctant to share customer information as 
fully as possible with other banks or to support developments that widen 
access to this information to non-bank providers of credit.  
Similar issues affect innovation in capital markets, although there platform 
access is sometimes supported by agreed communication protocols, for 
example those managed by Fix Protocol Ltd that support instructions for 
equity trades (see OXERA (2009)). But in many other areas of global capital 
markets firms have been reluctant to agree such standards, again because 
of concerns about loss of margins. 
More often than not the innovation in financial services that has taken 
place piggy backs on existing arrangements, rather than challenging them. 
Examples in retail payments include PayPal and the recent emergence of 
ApplePay and AndroidPay for point of sale mobile payments. PayPal offers 
convenient transfer of payments within a closed environment of PayPal 
accounts, but the introduction or withdrawal of purchasing power for use 
elsewhere requires a link to a bank account and the charges for so doing 
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can be high. ApplePay and AndroidPay are based on the relatively old NFC 
contactless technologies, supplemented by additional security on the 
phone and in transmission of payment instructions. As they require linkage 
to a bank transactions account, these are in effect a means for securely 
embedding a debit card within a mobile phone, unlike M-Pesa in Kenya 
these are not a fundamental challenge to existing bank payment 
arrangements. 
Weak incentives for innovation also help explain why most long established 
banks continue to struggle with managing and maintaining a huge body of 
legacy software, rather than replacing with integrated sytems. This is 
especially problematic for larger institutions that have acquired many 
smaller competitors over past decades. TECH UK (2015) have highlighted 
the difficulties of change: “One UK retail bank is running 6,700 applications 
on over 80,000 servers. This multitude of applications slows down any 
attempt at change or modernisation.” 
It might be thought that banks would gain substantially from a replacement 
program, substitution a single operational system in any particular product 
area, for a host of inherited legacy sytems. But systems investment is 
costly, in part becaue of the need to maintain the relatively complex 
interactions with industry payment, credit and other networks. Also such 
wholesale change risky – any failure of customer service provision would 
result in substantial reputational damage. Furthermore, while systems 
upgrade can reduce costs, it difficult to extract revenue benefits since 
customer experience is not directly affected by underlying operational 
systems. For all these reasons the costs and risks of large scale system 
upgrade have largely continued to outweigh any commercial benefits. 
The weak incentives for innovation, rooted in the network structure of 
banking and other financial services, mean that the future impact of 
FinTech on the banking industry is uncertain. Without action to address the 
market failures associated wiith the shared networks undermining the 
incentives for technology adoption, the impact of FinTech on the banking 
industry is likely to remain peripheral with little impact on core activities. 
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ompetition policy and innovation in network industries  
This section briefly reviews the theory of competition policy as 
applied to three network industries: household utilities, 
telecommunications and banking, discussing the implications for innovation 
and dynamic efficiency. This theory will then be applied in the following 
section, investigating ways in which access regulation can increases 
incentives for the adoption of new financial technologies in banking. 
The definition of network industries is a broad one, it includes any industry 
where either producers or consumer decisions are interdependent, with 
the cost of production or the utility from consumption depending not just 
on price and quantity but also on the production and consumption decision 
of other network participants (for further discussion see for example 
ECONOMIDES (1996)). The presence of such ‘network externalities’ is 
associated with market failure, unregulated competition does not produce 
an optimal outcome (the outcome is ‘pareto sub-optimal’ i.e. appropriate 
policy intervention may be able to improve on the welfare of some market 
participants without any loss of welfare to others.) The particular market 
falure highlighted by the present article is lack of incentives for adoption of 
new financial technologies (though many other outcomes are possible). 
Wideranging research and debate in the 1980s and 1990s addressed how 
best to promote of competition and efficient pricing and investment in 
household utilities. This challenge emerged in large part because of the 
large scale program of privitisation, begun by the Thatcher administration 
in the UK but later pursued by many governments worldwide. The key 
problem was how to ensure that profit-orientated providers in a network 
industry such as gas or electricity did not exploit their market power in 
order to extract high profits from consumers. 
Figure 2 illustrates the key insights that emerged two decades or more ago 
from this policy discussion. The first attempts at regulation of privatised 
utilities was based on price controls, typically on a cost-plus basis. The 
problem with that approach was that it undermined incentives to lower the 
C 
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costs of supply and – if the prices were set too low – also made investment 
in new capacity unprofitable. So a consensus emerged that is illustrated in 
Figure 2. A better approach by competition authorities was to distinguish 
the potentially competitive markets (market 2) e.g. generation of electricity 
and also customer services from the monopoly sector created by reliance 
on a shared network (market 1) e.g. the physical network used to carry gas 
or electricity to households. It became apparent that a better approach to 
regulation was regulation of access to and pricing of the shared network, 
allowing for competition in the potentially competive sector. 
The situation in most telcommunications and banking services is more 
complicated than that found in household utiltiies and more difficult to 
illustrate graphically. Both mobile telecommuications and banking are both 
characterised by platform competition. In order to make payments or 
complete telephone calls consumers need a service that links to consumers 
on other platforms not just their own. In some contexts this can lead to ‘co-
opetition‘: collaboration between producers that promotes access to each 
others networks and benefits consumers (SPIEGEL (2005)).  
Access of regulation is a key instrument of competition policy applied both 
to household utitlities and in the telcommunications industry, Authorities in 
both Europe and the US authorities have found it appropriate to introduce 
tailored regulatory regimes, with a legal framework that can allow them to 
regulate cross-platform access. While intervention has varied substantially 
both over time and between countries, access regulation has continued to 
play a major role in promoting competition and encouraging innovation (for 
discuss of the US see HAUSMAN AND TAYLOR (2013)).  
For banking regulatory policy has largely focused on prudential safety and 
customer protection rather than promoting competition and innovation.  
Competition interventions have until recently been based on the 
application general competition law, rather than on specific regulatory 
framework tailored to the specific network features of banking and other 
financial services. Examples include interventions to require disposal of 
bank branches to prevent institutions havng such a large market share that 
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they might abuse a dominant position. The governance arrangements of 
payment schemes have also been subject to regulatory investigation under 
general competition law (see MILNE (2007) for the case of the UK). The 
credit and debit card payment arrangements have also been subject to 
similar inquiries in a number of jurisdications. Payment schemes have also 
for example sometimes been required to provide more favourable terms of 
access to smaller ‘challenger’ institutions. But all these remedies are 
generally viewed as having only limited impact on banking sector 
competition and innovation. 
As discussed in the following section, authorities are now beginning to 
address seriously the challenge of regulating access to banking platforms, 
addressing more fully the implications of banking networks for competition 
and innovation, a key step if the full potential benefits of FinTech are to be 
realised. 
upporting FinTech through access regulation  
 
Having discussed the implications of network structure for competition policy and 
regulation, in household utilities, telecommunications and in banking, this section 
considers two ways in which public authorities can apply acess regulation, in order 
to ensure that full realisation of the potential of FinTech for improving services to 
bank customers and reducing bank costs and risks. This access regulation in respect 
of financial platforms, is critical in order for technology based innovation to 
compete effectively with incumbent banks. A start is already being made through 
the EU Payments Service Directive 2 (PSD2) and other measures on one form of 
access regulation, requiring banks to provide open-APIs to give third party access to 
their platforms and data. Much more remains still to be done in respect of the 
second form of access regulation, widening access to central bank money. In both 
cases the benefits will not be achieved from a one-off measures, this will require 
sustained regulatory oversight.  
e-APWG (2016) provides an overview of the role of APIs (or “Application 
Programming Interfaces”) in utilising information technology in banking. To 
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quote from this report “APIs can be seen as interfaces between software 
applications, both within as well as between organisations. More 
specifically: APIs enable communication between software applications 
where one application calls upon the functionality of another application. 
Every API is an interface, but not every interface is an API. API is a specific 
software architectural approach that revolves around the view that 
interfaces should be scalable, reusable and secure while offering ease of 
use for developers.” 
It is best to distinguish two forms of API: internal and open. Internal APIs 
provide am between a bank’s own customer service applications and 
underpinning operational systems. These underpinning systems are often 
mainframe applications that have changed little since first being 
commissioned in the 1970s or 1980s. Larger banks that have grown through 
acquisitions can easily have several operational systems which can be 
bridged through APIs. Gains in operational efficiency provide strong 
commercial incentives for using internal APIs as the interface with these 
older legacy systems. 
Open-APIs differ from internal APIs because they are interfaces between 
organisations. It is here that the key issues of access regulation to bank’s 
internal platforms and data arise. This has has already been recognised in 
the European Union where the second EU Payments Service Directive 
(PSD2), agreed by the European parliament in 2015, requires EU banks to 
provide open-APIs for payment services by October 2018. The directive 
requires both (i) that payments initiated via third party services through 
APIs must offer enhanced authentication of customer identity to avoid 
fraud; and (ii) that third parties must with customer agreement have access 
to transaction requests, to balances and to transaction history. Further 
functionality is also expected in relation to third party access to information 
on payment services fees and on additional protections to protect customer 
interests e.g. limits on larger value payments. 
The perception that APIs can be used to promote competition in banking 
has been taken a step further in the UK, where HM Treasury established an 
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Open Banking Working Group that had developed a standard for ‘open 
banking’ (THE OPEN BANKING WORKING GROUP (2016)) in which APIs are 
used to provide third parties with wide ranging access to bank platforms 
and data, not just payments. This has in turn been taken up in the final 
report ng COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (2016) of the recently 
concluded two-year investigation of competition in UK retail bank. This final 
report is supporting open banking by requiring banks to release and make 
available through an open-APIs, by the end of Q1 2017, and thereafter 
maintain as open data, a wide range of reference and product information, 
including (i) the prices, charges, terms and conditions for all personal and 
business current account products (including overdrafts) and small business 
lending products; and (ii) service quality indicators (for example customer 
recommendation scores) specified by the CMA in its remedy on service 
quality and at the time required by this remedy. In addition they plan that 
banks provide open-APIs with full read and write functionality payment and 
transaction data not later than the October 2018 deadline for compliance 
with PSD2.  
As argued by CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND (2016) PSD2 can be expected to 
accelerate technological change by forcing banks to use APIs to open up 
consumer payment accounts for appropriately licensed, innovative service 
providers. It will also be a fundamental strategic challenge to incumbent 
banks, who will have to focus on ensuring they exploit the opportunities of 
technology to improve customer experience. PLEITER, J., & DE JONG, J. 
(2016) provide an overview of the strategic issues. They argue that banks 
face a choice between a pro-active response – taking up the opportunity to 
collaborate with third parties to enhance customer services--  or a reactive 
response, limiting themselves to regulatory compliance but risking loss of 
market share and revenue to more nimble and innovative competitors.  
It is worth briefly mentioning some examples of the innovations that are 
likely to be supported by open-APIs and open banking. One possibility is 
much improved third party aggregation of banking products, which would 
make it possible to hold and compare a number of accounts and 
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investments provided by different institutions within one portal. Third 
parties, with appropriate permissioning, could be allowed to change and 
initiate payment instructions.   
This kind of innovation should also provide an effective competitive 
challenge to the high charges imposed by card schemes for international 
transactions, which can cost consumers as much as 5% or more of 
transaction value and add quite a lot to the cost of an overseas visit. An 
aggregator service can allow a consumer to link a pre-paid card that avoids 
these high charges to their bank account, with transfers that maintains the 
pre-paid balance at a level sufficient for daily needs, with excess returned 
at the close of the trip.  
Another innovation is access to the shared credit information, including 
payment histories, that is critical to making loan approval decisions. SMEs 
that are refused credit by banks that provide them with payment services 
can look to obtain credit from alternative providers through sharing of their 
payment histories. 
Overtime aggregation tools may also substantially alter competition in the 
full range of payments services, whether business to business (B2B) or 
consumer to business (C2B); and whether online and in person. Security 
concerns are naturally prominent, so these developments must be pursued 
slowly and carefully, but APIs are also potentially security enhancing.  
The second access issue is the potential promotion of competition through 
giving non-bank payment service providers access to central bank money, 
the underlying settlement asset for payment transactions. At present it is 
only banks that can offer final settlement of payments in central bank 
money, whether for payors (recipients of funds) or payees (senders of 
funds). This means that only banks can offer final settlement of payments 
from payor to payee, non-banks without such access are forced to pay 
relatively high bank charges in order to settle payments indirectly through 
banks.  
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This is another example of access regulation: the competitive position of 
payment services provided by non-bank providers such as those offering 
alternative foreign exchange is fundamentally different if they can directly 
transact in central bank money and so bypass the need to relying on a bank 
to complete the final leg of a payment. 
While not yet pursued through practical policy measures, the possibility of 
allowing non-bank payment service providers direct access to central bank 
money is now being actively discussed. Most notably the Bank of England 
has recently announced that it will allow such access (CARNEY (2016)), 
although the operational details of this access have yet been publically 
announced. Still, this is of great potential significance to non-bank provision 
of mobile and foreign exchange payments.  
To give one example, alternative foreign exchange providers such as 
Transferwise sometimes have structural imbalances in international 
payment flows. From personal communication I understand that while 
Transferwise transactions between pound sterling and Euro are largely 
balanced and so net out with only small balances that must be transacted in 
wholesale markets, for other currency pairs, e.g. sterling against Indian 
rupee, there is a structural flow in one direction. In this case, in order to 
provide near mid-market pricing to customers Transferwise need to be able 
to access wholesale foreign exchange markets on the same terms as their 
bank competitors. Direct transactions in central bank money gives the 
abilty to do this. The development is directly analogous to the access 
regulation of the monopoly market in household utilities illustrated by 
Figure 2. Access to central bank money supports potential competition in 
the consumer markets auch as foreign exchange transactions. A similar 
opening up to competition can also be expected in for example mobile 
payments, allowing alternative mobile payments to develop with much 
lower charges to retailers than for example ApplePay or PayPal. 
In both these cases, APIs and central bank money, there is devil in the 
detail. While application to payments services are already taking place, 
through PSD2, many of technical rules are still to be finalised. While the 
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thrust of  PSD2 – opening up access to bank’s own internal platforms and 
data – is welcome, it remains to be seen how effective is the enforcement 
of the directive. While banks will certainly have to introduce open-APIs to 
comply with the directive, it remains to be seen how well will this will serve 
the requirements to third party competitors and other banks who seek to 
access the bank’s plaforms and data to offer competing services to 
customers. The situation is very different from that of say Uber using an 
open-API to embed google maps into their taxi-booking service, because 
these third party competitors will want to access the open-APIs of many 
banks not just one. Will standardisation be possible so that different bank 
open-APIs do offer uniform performance? What steps are needed to both 
achieve and enforce these standards? 
Even more questions surround cccess to central bank money for non-bank 
payment servie providers. This is fine sounding in principle, but it this hs not 
yet been implemented practically and there are many questions about the 
extent to which this will allow FinTech innovators to participate in or 
compete with incumbent banks. For example what charges will they face 
for transferring central bank money into or out of the bank accounts of 
customers and will supporting price regulation be required? 
These considerations make clear that the access regulation of banking 
plaforms by competition regulators and other public authorities is a one-
time effort. A good start has been made, especially through the 
requirement fof open-APIs in PSD2, but achieving the goal of ‘open banking’ 
which supports wide ranging technical innovation to lower costs and 
improve customer experience, will require sustained oversight by 
competition and regulatory authorities to ensure effective standardised 
access to all the platforms used in the delivery of banking services. 
onclusions  
This paper has examined the current wave of FinTech innovation from 
a network economics perspective, arguing that regulation of access to 
banking platforms is an essential pre-requisite for new FinTech ventures to 
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provide truly effective competition to incumbent banks in the provision of 
payment, credit and other services.  The situation parallels that of other 
network industries, especially telecommunications, where access regulation 
is also necessary in order to support competitive service provision and 
technological innovation.  
Two forms of access regulation have been highlighted. The first is the 
requirement for banks to provide ‘open-APIs’ that support third party 
access to their internal platforms and data. An important first step on this 
form of access regulation is the European Payments Services Directive 2 
(PSD2), with banks having to comply by October 2018. In the UK the 
potential for using ‘open-APIs’ to promote bank competition and 
innovation is is being taken further through the creation of the Open Bank 
Standard and the reccommendations of the recently concluded competition 
inquiry into retail banking.  Much of the required detail however, in order 
for open-APIs to to fully effective as a tool of access regulation, is still being 
worked out. A continued further regulatory effort will be needed to ensure 
that banks do offer third-parties the kind of access that allows them to 
effectively compete in the provision of payment and other services. 
The second form of access regulation highlighted here is the access to the 
central bank money that is required for final settlement of payments 
between customers. At present non-bank technology based competitors 
have to rely on and pay banks for the service of final settlement. In some 
cases, for example alternative foreign exchange, this is a serious 
impediment to developing a technology based service that competes with 
incumbent banks. Central banks world-wide are now starting to entertain 
the possibility of allowing non-banks the opportunity to transact directly in 
central bank money, with the Bank of England now committed to allowing 
such access to some non-bank firms. 
These efforts at access regulation are critical for the future of FinTech. The 
experience of banking and other financial services, discussed briefly here, 
illustrates how inventives for innovation have in the past been weak. Banks 
have had unchallenged control over their own proprietary platforms and 
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data- Banks have been the only providers of the essential final link the 
settlement of payments. For these reasons non-bank providers of 
technology based credit and payment services have struggled to compete 
with incumbent bank, while banks themselves have obtained little 
competitive advantage to gain from technological innovation. 
Without effective access regulation incumbent banks will be able to 
effectively resist the FinTech challenge. The new entrepreneurs will be 
limited to serving niche markets that banks serve inadequately or not at all. 
Banks will use technology to lower costs in existing bank channels and to 
provide new internet and mobile based access to banking services. But 
these developments will represent only an evolution of existing practice not 
a transformation. 
With effective access regulation, banks will face strong competition from a 
range of new FinTech providers, offering lower cost and more convenient 
payment and credit services. This will in turn require banks to respond, 
those who successfully cope will be the banks that respond pro-actively, 
seeking to work with non-bank FinTech providers to improve their own 
customer experience.  
Finally it must be recognised that effective access regulation, giving 
competitors standardised and low cost access both to internal bank 
platforms and data and to transactions in central bank money for payments 
settlement, is not just a matter of legislation or a one-time change of rules. 
Implementation matters. Left to themselves banks have little incentive to 
implement in a way that ensures non-bank competitors have low cost 
access to banking platforms.  Effective access regulation requires sustained 
regulatory oversight and co-operation between industry and the authorities 
to address barriers to platoform access when and where these arise.  
 
 
 
A. MILNE 17 
References 
 
ACCENTURE (2016). FinTech and the Evolving Landscape: Landing Points for 
the Industry. Retrieved from 
http://www.fintechinnovationlablondon.co.uk/pdf/Fintech_Evolving_Lands
cape_2016.pdf  
ARMSTRONG, Mark, COWAN, S. AND VICKERS, John., (1994), Regulatory 
Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience, MIT Press 
BROADBENT, B. (2016). Central banks and digital currencies. Bank of 
England. Retrieved from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/886.asp
x 
CARNEY, M. (2016). Enabling the FinTech transformation: Revolution, 
Restoration or Reformation? Speech by the Governor of the Bank of 
England. Retrieved from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/sp
eech914.pdf 
COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY. (2016). Retail banking market 
investigation: final report. London. Retrieved from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a9c52b40f0b608a700000
a/retail-banking-investigation-full-final-report.pdf  
CORTET, Mounaim; RIJKS, Tom; NIJLAND, Shikko (2016): “PSD2: The 
digital transformation accelerator for banks”, Journal of Payments Strategy & 
Systems, Spring 2016, pp. 13-27(15) 
e-APWG. (2016). Understanding the business relevance of Open APIs and 
Open Banking for banks, Euro Banking Association  
ECONOMIDES Nicholas. "The economics of networks." International journal 
of industrial organization 14.6 (1996): 673-699. 
FARRELL, J., & SALONER, G. (1985). Standardization, Compatibility, and 
Innovation. The RAND Journal of Economics, 16(1), 70–83.  
18  xxx 
BELLOC, F., NICITA, A., & PARCU, P. L. (2013). Liberalizing 
telecommunications in Europe: path dependency and institutional 
complementarities. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(1), 132–154. 
GRAJEK, M., & RÖLLER, L.-H. (2012). Regulation and investment in 
network industries: Evidence from European telecoms. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 55(1), 189–216. 
HAUSMAN, J. A., & TAYLOR, W. E. (2013). Telecommunication in the US: 
from regulation to competition (almost). Review of Industrial Organization, 
42(2), 203–230. 
IBM INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS VALUE (2005) “The Paradox of Banking 
2015: achieving more by doing less”. Retrieved from https://www-
304.ibm.com/easyaccess/fileserve?contentid=98335 
MBITI I. & WEIL D. N. (2011). Mobile banking: The impact of M-Pesa in 
Kenya. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
MILNE Alistair (2006): "What's in it for us? Network externalities and bank payment 
innovation", Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, pp. 1613-1630  
MILNE Alistair (2007): "Governance and Innovation in UK Payments", 
Communications and Strategies, No. 66, 2nd Q. 2007 
MILNE Alistair (2015). Achieving European Policy Objectives through 
Financial Technology. Retrieved from 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/achieving-european-policy-objectives-
through-financial-technology 
NARAYANAN, A., BONNEAU, J., FELTEN, E., FELTEN, A., & 
GOLDFEDER, S. (2016). Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies. 
Princeton University Press. 
OXERA. (2009). What are the benefits of the FIX protocol? Oxford, UK. 
Retrieved from http://www.oxera.com/Publications/Reports/2009/What-are-
the-benefits-of-the-FIX-Protocol-.aspx  
PLEITER, J., & DE JONG, J. (2016). PSD2: Making it actionable. Backbase. 
Webinar retrieved from http://blog.backbase.com/4598/yesterdays-
webinar-psd2  
A. MILNE 19 
SPIEGEL, Menahem. (2005). Coopetition in the telecommunications 
industry. In M. A. Crew & M. Spiegel (Eds.), Obtaining the best from 
regulation and competition (pp. 93–108). Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
TECH UK. (2015). Taking the Initiative: Leading with Technology in Financial 
Services. Retrieved from https://www.techuk.org/insights/reports/item/4638-
techuk-urges-financial-services-industry-to-get-digital-faster  
THE OPEN BANKING WORKING GROUP (2016). The Open Banking Standard. 
Retrieved from https://www.scribd.com/doc/298569302/The-Open-
Banking-Standard 
UK COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (2016): “Investigatio of Retail 
Banking: Provisional Decision on Remedies” Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/523755/retail_banking_market_pdr.pdf  
WARDROP, R., ZHANG, B., RAU, R., & GRAY, M. (2015). Moving 
Mainstream: The European Alternative Finance Benchmarking Report.  
WARDROP, R., ROSENBERG, R., ZHANG, B., ZIEGLER, T., SQUIRE, R., 
BURTON, J., AND GARVEY K. (2016). Breaking New Ground: The 
Americas Alternative Finance Benchmarking Report 
ZHANG, B., BAECK, P., ZIEGLER, T., BONE, J., & GARVEY, K. (2016). 
Pushing Boundaries: The 2015 UK Alternative Finance Industry Report.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: The Enterprise Opportunity, documenting the new wave of 
FinTech.  This figure (by New Finance Innovations Limited and taken from 
(Zilgalvis, 2014)) provides a colourful illustration of the range of new 
FinTech activities.  
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